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ABSTRACT
Objective: To analyze the active failures and the latent conditions related to errors in 
intensive nursing care and to discuss the reactive and proactive measures mentioned 
by the nursing team. Method: Qualitative, descriptive, exploratory study conducted at 
the Intensive Care Unit of a general hospital. Data were collected through interviews, 
participant observation and submitted to lexical analysis in the ALCESTE® software 
and to ethnographic analysis. Results: 36 professionals of the nursing team participated 
in the study. The analysis originated three lexical classes: Error in intensive care nursing; 
Active failures and latent conditions related to errors in the intensive care nursing 
team; Reactive and proactive measures adopted by the nursing team regarding errors 
in intensive care. Conclusion: Reactive and proactive measures influenced the safety 
culture, in particular, the recognition of errors by professionals, contributing to their 
prevention, safety and quality care.
DESCRIPTORS
Patient Safety; Medical Errors; Critical Care Nursing; Intensive Care Units; Nursing 
Care.
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INTRODUCTION
Patient safety is a fundamental principle of health care. 
In recent years, there has been a significant increase in dis-
cussions on care-associated injuries. Currently, medical errors 
are the third leading cause of death in the United States. 
In the United Kingdom, it is estimated that one accident 
causing harm occurs every 35 seconds(1).
The publication of the report “To Err is Human: Building 
a Safer Health Care System” alerted society to the occur-
rence of adverse events in hospital institutions, estimating 
that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year 
in hospitals as a result of medical errors. However, almost 
two decades after this publication and despite the adoption 
of several recommended strategies, the number of adverse 
events did not decrease as expected(2).
Errors can cause serious damage to healthcare users 
and qualitatively and quantitatively affect the institutions. 
For the professionals, error is often related to feelings of 
shame, guilt and fear of punishment, given the existing 
punitive culture that is directed to omissions and misses 
out on the opportunity to understand and adequately 
manage error.
In this study, James Reason’s Human Error Theory, also 
known as the “Swiss Cheese Model”, was used as theoreti-
cal framework. This theory provides a proper understanding 
and conduct towards these errors. It does not blame only the 
professional and emphasizes the need for a complete analysis 
of the entire organizational system(3).
According to this theory, error is classified as: “error of 
execution - unintentional use of a wrong plan to achieve 
an aim” and “error of planning – failure of a planned action 
to be completed as intended”. Errors indicate the potential 
existence of adverse events, understood as incidents that 
harm patients, and which, if not adequately managed, can 
realize their potential. Active failures in defense systems are 
related to errors committed by people, and latent conditions 
are related to the organizational system(4-5).
From a managerial perspective, it is important to under-
stand that errors occur mainly because of problems in the 
organizational system, and not only because professionals 
make mistakes. It is fundamental to identify the weaknesses 
in the process and adopt preventive measures, since recog-
nizing the real dimension of the problems will be a unique 
opportunity to improve patient safety(4,6).
In this context, the Human Error Theory proposes the 
management of error through reactive and proactive mea-
sures aimed at improving organizational processes. The reac-
tive measures are those adopted after the occurrence of the 
error, and the proactive measures are those that are aimed 
at preventing and avoiding future occurrences, emphasizing 
the organizational safety culture(6).
Regarding intensive care nursing, it is up to the team to 
“define and monitor indicators of prevention or reduction 
of adverse events pertinent to the unit, as well as to collect, 
analyze, establish corrective actions, report adverse events 
and technical complaints to the risk management sector or 
to another sector, according to the institutional norms”(7).
Institutions must stimulate professionals to notify errors 
and adverse events, increasing the awareness of occurrences. 
However, due to the punitive culture, the occurrences are, 
in most cases, underreported, which hinders the knowledge 
of their extent and the adoption of proactive measures(8).
Understanding the occurrence of errors may encourage 
the professional to properly report it, which will help chang-
ing the current underreporting scenario. It is important to 
invest in organizational safety culture, disseminating the 
concept of patient safety and promoting non-punitive dis-
cussions about human error.
Thus, the objectives of this article are: to analyze the 
active failures and the latent conditions related to errors in 
intensive nursing care and to discuss the reactive and proac-
tive measures stated by the nursing team.
METHOD
Type of sTudy
Qualitative, descriptive and exploratory study. Based on 
the Human Error Theory, the method of “Questionnaire 
Studies”(4) was used. It consisted in the analysis of the par-
ticipant’s answers regarding the types of errors, and their 
observation when exposed to stressful situations, such as 
nursing professionals in intensive care.
scenario
“The study setting was the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) 
of a general federal public hospital member of the Brazilian 
Network of Sentinel Hospitals of the Brazilian Health 
Surveillance Agency (ANVISA – Agência Nacional de 
Vigilância Sanitária)”(9). The ICU has 22 beds, divided into 
three sectors: ICU 1 (10 beds), ICU 2 (9 beds), and Annex (4 
beds). The same multi-professional team works in all sectors 
according to a monthly scale.
The nursing team consisted of 83 professionals. The 
inclusion criteria were: being a permanent employee/public 
servant, “being allocated at the ICU, and working in the 
sector for more than 6 months. The exclusion criteria were: 
being on leave from the ICC during the data collection 
period due to holidays and other leaves”(9).
daTa collecTion
After applying the described criteria, 63 professionals (22 
nurses and 41 nursing assistants were selected). However, 
36 professionals, 13 nurses and 23 nursing assistants who 
worked in the day and night shifts participated in the study. 
It is worth noting that 06 (six) professionals refused to par-
ticipate, reporting they felt discomfort regarding the discus-
sions about human error and eventual occurrences in the 
ICU. The other 21 professionals were not available due to 
the multiple work activities and shift changes(8).
The profile of the participants was characterized based on 
the variables gender, professional category, age, training time 
and time working in the ICU. Data were collected between 
July and September of 2013, using individual interviews(8) 
and participant observation. The semi-structured interview 
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script presented questions about the understanding and pro-
fessional positioning regarding errors in care, as well as the 
causal and preventive factors related to error. “The interviews 
were recorded in MP4 and later transcribed”(9).
The participant observation script guided the activity by 
topics including the adequacy of the scenario to safety, the 
interrelation between the participants and the identification 
of situations that can lead to error. A total of 130 hours of 
observations were recorded in field diaries.
daTa analysis and TreaTmenT
“The data were submitted to lexical analysis, using 
the software Analyse Lexicale  par Contexte d’un Ensemble 
de Segments de Texte – ALCESTE®. The observation data 
were submitted to ethnographic analysis and the results were 
presented along with the results produced in ALCESTE”(9).
For this analysis, a corpus was prepared and produced 
“three lexical classes, named according to the analysis of the 
senses and meanings of the corresponding words and the 
most significant Elementary Context Units (ECUs), namely: 
Error in intensive care nursing (class 3)”(9); Active failures and 
latent conditions related to errors of the intensive care nursing 
team (class 2); Reactive and proactive measures adopted by 
the nursing team regarding errors in intensive care (class 1).
eThical aspecTs
The study was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committees of the proposing and co-participating institu-
tions, according to protocol no. 229,926 of March 26th, 2013 
and no. 292,974 of June 10th, 2013. “The study respected all 
aspects of Resolution 466/12 of National Health Council”(9).
RESULTS
Of the 36 participants, 64% were nursing assistants and 
36% were nurses. The female gender predominated (81%) 
and the age ranged from 30 to 59 years. Regarding profes-
sional training, 40% had less than 10 years of training and 
73% had 4 to 10 years in the ICU. All the nursing assistants 
who participated had technical training in nursing, however, 
they were hired by the Ministry of Health as nursing assis-
tants through a public call test.
“The corpus analyzed obtained 74% of use, with 4,466 
distinct analyzable forms or words, 1,181 ECUs selected, of 
which 73% were classified in three classes, divided in two 
thematic blocks. The first thematic block only produced class 
3 and represented 34% of the total corpus, consisting of 161 
analyzable words and 292 ECUs”(9). The second thematic 
block gave rise to classes 1 and 2, class 1 represented 37% 
of the corpus, which was constituted by 124 analyzing words 
and 324 ECUs, and class 2 represented 29%, with 129 ana-
lyzing words and 251 ECUs.
error in inTensive care nursing
The identification of errors in nursing care in the ICU 
was associated with the variables female gender and age 
between 20 and 30 years. “Medication errors were illustrated 
by the words: medication (Khi2 101), patient (Khi2 75), put 
(Khi2 45) and change (Khi2 42)”(9), which referred to errors 
in the preparation and administration of medications.
We have a system in which we put the serum to dilute all the 
medications. We take the serum with the syringe and needle 
and dilute all the medications, which ends up contaminating 
it (UCE 1065). 
One time the patient had a fever and I administered dipyrone, 
and I did not communicate it to the team, so it is not checked, and 
it may be done again. Sometimes the physician asks for some-
thing, as it happened in bed two and it was not an emergency, it 
was a tube exchange, and that’s between us. He asks for dipyro-
ne, and we do not write it in the record and in the prescription 
(UCE 158)(9).
Inappropriate use of infusion pumps was also reported.
Sometimes you do not know how to handle the pump or you don’t 
pay attention. It has happened, like with ‘dormonid’, which has 
to last until the next morning, then you look 2 hours later and 
everything has gone in, and then the patient is hypotensive and 
all decompensated (UCE 283)(9).
“The alarm of an infusion pump went off for 15 min-
utes without anyone checking what was happening. Then, 
I turned off the alarm and saw that the saline solution 
with electrolytes being infused was over. I communicated 
the team, who installed a new solution after my request” 
(Excerpt from the field diary)(9).
Prescription alterations and errors were also cited:
With medication, a mistake I often see is not the exchange of 
medication, it is usually between the prescription and what is 
on the pump, the medication that is being administered, but 
is not prescribed and medication that is prescribed and is not 
administered (UCE 805)(9).
“Not raising the bed rails was mentioned and related to 
the risk of falling from the bed. This problem was identified 
through the words bed (Khi2 41) and rail (Khi2 26)”(9).
Sometimes you go to the bed and you really leave the rail down 
(UCE 24)(9).
“When I observed the bed bath performed by a nursing 
technician, I saw that he left the bed four times to pick up 
material, and the patient, who was with an orotracheal tube, 
sedated and on a zero degree position, was left exposed and 
with all rails lowered” (Excerpt from the field diary)(9).
“Not raising the rails was also related to the quality of 
the furniture used at the ICU, given the difficulty to lock 
the bed rails”(9):
The rail that goes down is close and if you do not put it right, 
it will go down. So you may not lock it right and then it will 
go down. There are other problems with the bed, the wires too, 
because it is attached to the mattress, and when you lower it, if 
you don’t observe everything around it, you may pull out a pro-
be, so besides the bed being bad, the rail is also not good (UCE 
132-133)(9).
“Unplanned accidental extubations were related to the 
radiographic examinations in the bed and associated with 
the word: x-ray (Khi2 36)”(9).
And you go look and the patient looks fine, he’s on ventilation, 
4 www.ee.usp.br/reeusp
Patient safety: understanding human error in intensive nursing care
Rev Esc Enferm USP · 2018;52:e03406
but it’s out of place, because sometimes, for example, the x-ray 
has gone by, it was retracted and you looked from far away and 
thought that everything was fine, but when you go and look 
closer... (UCE 804)(9).
acTive failures and laTenT condiTions relaTed To 
errors in The inTensive care nursing Team
This class was not associated with any specific variable, 
and the words highlighted were: training (Khi2 50), service 
(Khi2 45), education (Khi2 43) and permanent (Khi2 37), 
which may be associated with the need for education and 
in-service training.
I have always worked in the ICU, I have spent most of my life 
in the ICU, and we see that the ICU is a sector that requires 
training, then it gets an employee who has no skill and he hears 
that it’s all easy (UCE 1147).
“Occurrences such as inadequate use of bonnets, gloves 
and masks, failure to elevate bed rails and inadequate per-
formance of techniques could be corrected with in-service 
training and capacity building strategies. The professionals 
of the nursing team complained about the lack of training 
regarding new technologies, which contributes to the lack of 
commitment of the team” (Excerpt from field diary).
At this meeting we had now with the boss, he even said that, 
in partnership with the Study Center, he will train this staff 
that has arrived. Some of them worked someday shifts, but it’s 
no use because the daytime routine is also full of service and we 
don’t have time to teach then, and at night we have even less 
time (UCE 974).
The deficient professional training and the hiring of pro-
fessionals without experience and training were related to 
the occurrence of errors:
I think that when you hire for intensive therapy, you got to see. 
In public service, they hire without a proper research, without 
a more thorough look. So, in the end, people came in totally un-
prepared, some even wanted to learn, but had never worked in 
this area (UCE 735).
Work overload and low staffing were associated with 
the words load (Khi2 26), shift (Khi2 26) and employees 
(Khi2 20).
Nursing is very overloaded, not only in this sector, but also many 
times they come from other shifts, and there is a need to seek a 
better quality of life working two, three jobs (UCE 208).
“When I arrived in the sector, I found the nursing, the 
routine and the management staff stressed and discouraged, 
complaining about the working conditions in the ICU and 
the deficit in the number of professionals” (Excerpt from 
the field diary).
Overload and working multiple jobs generate fatigue, 
lack of attention and commitment and professional dissat-
isfaction, highlighted by the word “tired” (Khi2 17).
I think the person is tired because they come from another shift, 
because the workload is bad, because the person has to have two 
jobs and sometimes, he/she is working for 24 or 36 hours and this 
all hinders the development of work (UCE 123).
Dissatisfaction with the material resources and the lack 
of maintenance was mentioned, highlighting problems with 
the transportation monitor of the sector:
“I immediately took the monitor and told them to get it away 
from here, so they disappeared with it. I called the responsible 
technician and I told him that I had asked him to come see it and 
he did not, so I told him that I did not want it here, and if I had 
a test, I would not go down because of him (...) Because it’s been 
months we asked them to see this monitor and something like 
that had to happen for us to get a more drastic solution, to take 
the monitor and fix it, and he brought another one on the same 
day (UCE 516-517)”(9).
reacTive and proacTive measures adopTed by The 
nursing Team regarding errors in inTensive care
The main variables associated with this class were the 
male gender and working in the ICU for more than 11 
years. The analytical words referred to the positioning of 
the nursing team in the face of errors in the ICU, and the 
highlighted words were err (Khi2 65), try (Khi2 55), speak 
(Khi2 25), talks (Khi2 24), think (Khi2 20), am (Khi2 21) 
and solve (Khi2 16). The need for effective communication 
between professionals was evidenced, since it may interfere 
with the occurrence and prevention of error.
I try to avoid it. I usually speak like this: Guys, I’m going to 
administer medication to the patient. You see, because if I make 
a mistake, everyone is wrong together. It’s a joke, but sometimes 
other points of view can help more. Every human being is liable 
to error, but the error in nursing is very complicated because we 
deal with lives, so they are often irreparable errors, that’s the 
difference (UCE 1139).
The participants related the leadership and supervision 
activities carried out by the nurse to the prevention and 
occurrence of errors in the ICU.
Leadership is also exercised in a natural way, so I try to reduce as 
much as possible the number of mistakes in the team and I work 
as well as possible within the technique (UCE 335).
Underreporting of errors was related to fear of criticism 
and difficulties with interpersonal relations in the work envi-
ronment, manifested in the word team (Khi2 31).
The staff likes to criticize, to point out fingers. When everyone is 
together, there is a bit of criticism. When you try to ask before, I 
think they even try to help you, explain it to you, but if you make 
a mistake, they talk about your mistake (UCE 990).
And there is not much discussion, we just talk normally. And it 
depends on where the error originated. Some speak, and some 
try to not give away easily. We see it, but the person does not 
admit (UCE 59).
“The nurse on call complained about the great amount of 
medical errors and that these are silenced by the team, unlike 
the errors involving the nursing team, which are treated in 
a critical and negative way” (Excerpt from the field diary).
The need to discuss the occurrence of the error in the 
ICU was identified through the words conversation (Khi2 
24), situation (Khi2 18) and solve (Khi2 16).
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No, there is no conversation, not about improvement, nor about 
errors. There was no conversation about improvement, only in 
closed groups, like, I sit down with another colleague and talk 
about what we found interesting, but everybody together, no 
(UCE 589).
When they identify the error, the professionals initially 
try to solve the problem, causing the “least possible damage” 
to the patient, highlighting the importance of understanding 
the error, avoiding new occurrences and solving the problem.
I think the mistake is inevitable. The professionals can deal with 
it, most of them in a positive way. First, we try to minimize 
the effects of this error, then we sit down with who made it to 
try to understand the reason for the error and prevent it from 
happening again (UCE 2).
DISCUSSION
The analysis of the variables related to the participants 
showed a heterogeneous group, which may interfere in the 
learning and training processes, since older professionals 
learn differently from the newly graduated(10). In the group 
studied, 60% of the interviewees had more than 10 years 
of training, which can result in learning conflicts and less 
effective development.
It is important to encourage the integration of the group 
to promote proper teamwork, encourage effort and offer an 
environment conducive to personal relationships, which may 
contribute to patient safety.
error in inTensive care nursing
The errors identified came from the judgment of the 
professionals interviewed. It is worth noting that, rather than 
pointing out the error, it is necessary to understand it and 
allow the professional to make a judgment about his actions.
In the Human Error Theory, error is associated with two 
approaches: the person and the system approach, related to 
different philosophies of error management. The errors iden-
tified were related to the system approach, which considers 
that humans are fallible and errors are to be expected in 
all organizations and are associated with systemic factors(4).
Errors are classified according to the cognitive stage of 
occurrence and the action involved. They may be related to 
planning (mistakes), storage (lapses) and execution (slips)(4). 
Planning errors were related to the decision-making process 
or planning of the action, such as errors in the preparation of 
medications. Storage and execution errors were exemplified 
by not raising bed rails and improper handling of equipment.
Cognitive stages interrelate, and, depending on the situ-
ation, errors can be associated with more than one stage. 
For example, a medication error can occur because it was 
prepared in the wrong way due to incorrect planning of the 
action (mistake), improperly stored in the sector (lapse) and 
administered outside of the prescribed time, in the wrong 
patient, wrong route or wrong technique (slip).
The medication process involves several steps from 
prescription until drug administration. Nursing acts in the 
stages of preparation and administration of medication, and 
must meet the nine rights, which include: “right patient, 
right medication, right route, right dose, right time, right 
documentation, knowledge of the action, pharmaceutical 
presentation and monitor the effect”(11). “In addition, it is 
essential to clarify doubts and identify the drug with the 
patient’s name, bed, name of the medication, route of admin-
istration, drip and time of infusion”(12).
These steps are related to the basic principles of nurs-
ing and institutional norms and routines, and not following 
them may interfere with patient safety. A study that ana-
lyzed 339 medication errors identified that 291 errors were 
directly related to the workforce, that is, to the professionals 
performing the action. Of these, 43.4% were related to the 
right medication, 27.4% to the right documentation, 12.1% 
to the right patient, 11.2% to the right time, 3.2% to the 
right route, and 2.7% to the right dose(13).
Falls are another common occurrence in hospitals, respon-
sible for two out of every five adverse events. “Injuries deriving 
from the falls occur in between 15% and 50% of the events, 
resulting in a wide range of damage, such as post-fall syndrome, 
increased morbidity, recovery problems and increased hospital-
ization”(9,14). “Harms resulting from falls are also related to the 
length of hospital stay and the increase in the costs of care”(9,15).
Unplanned/accidental extubations were related to radio-
graphic examinations in bed and other procedures. It was 
observed that no professional of the nursing team accom-
panied the procedure in order to help and avoid possible 
occurrences, due to their overload of work.
Accidental extubation has a less effective risk manage-
ment compared to other events, and is a frequent concern 
in intensive care. It may be related to clinical factors such as 
patient agitation, inadequate fixation of ventilation device 
and lack of sedation, or to systemic factors such as profes-
sional inexperience, insufficient staffing, among others(16).
To prevent the situations described and modify the real-
ity, it is fundamental to engage the multi-professional team 
and managers, investing in a clear and effective communi-
cation to identify occurrences. This way, it will be possible 
to find effective barriers, defenses and safeguards, since the 
fragilities of the system will be known.
acTive failures and laTenT condiTions relaTed To 
errors of The inTensive care nursing Team
Failures in the barriers and safeguards of organizational 
defense systems have the function of protecting victims from 
risk situations. Weaknesses in the system will always exist 
and may occur due to active failures and latent conditions(6).
Active failures are committed by people who are at the 
endpoint of the system, and can be exemplified by misiden-
tification of patients, failure to check medical and nursing 
prescriptions, inadequate use of alarms and aseptic tech-
niques, administration of suspended medications, and mis-
identification of medications.
The latent conditions are originated in organizational 
decision-making, and may lie dormant for years before they 
are combined with active failures and cause accidents. Both 
active failures and latent conditions are not easily predicted, 
however, awareness about them will lead to the adoption of 
proactive management(6).
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Among the latent conditions identified, the lack of pro-
fessional qualification programs was highlighted, which is 
fundamental for the professionals that work in intensive 
care. Training leads to the mastery of technical-scientific 
knowledge and contributes to establishing a link between 
theory and practice in the work environment, expanding 
the possibilities of intervention and the use of technologi-
cal resources and ensuring safety for both the professional 
and the patient(17).
Complex situations that demand decisions in the 
ICU require professionals prepared to face ethical and 
technical problems. As for nurses, it is their responsibil-
ity to prevent, detect and act immediately and effectively 
on complications, which may not happen if they are not 
properly trained(18).
The nursing team must engage in the training process 
through continuous learning, improving their skills and provid-
ing quality service. For this, it is up to the managers to stimulate 
creativity, efficiency and learning, individually and in groups, 
satisfying the needs of the team and promoting among their 
employees the notion of being a “learning organization”(19).
Overload related to long work shifts impairs safety foun-
dations. In the United States, more than half of nurses work 
less than 40 hours per week, which is associated with excel-
lent patient safety outcomes(20).
In situations where these professionals work more 
than 60 hours a week, which may be associated with other 
employment relationships, there is a deficiency of functional 
staff, forcing workers to act in a “crisis mode”, trying to 
do too much too quickly and without the necessary atten-
tion. This overload leads to stress and fatigue, factors that 
compromise performance and may result in errors, lack of 
communication and mutual help, interpersonal problems 
and loss of respect and understanding(20).
It is practically impossible to eliminate active failures 
and latent conditions, since the system is not closed. For 
this reason, it is essential to invest in specific and continuous 
security measures, called reactive and proactive measures(6).
reacTive and proacTive measures adopTed by The 
nursing Team regarding errors in inTensive care
Effective safety management consists of knowing what 
is manageable or not. Instead of exercising control over 
accidents, the organizational processes must be improved, 
which can be done through reactive measures – collecting 
information and tracking occurrences – and proactive mea-
sures – adopted before the occurrence based on a situational 
diagnosis – in a way that both measures interrelate(6).
Among the reactive measures identified were the inter-
viewees’ recognition that errors occur in daily care, error 
neglect due to punitive culture, fear of criticism, feelings of 
shame, guilt and frustration and the attempts made by the 
professionals to undo the possible damages.
Proactive measures were associated with organizational 
factors, prioritizing the correction of failures at a higher 
organizational level, which helps to reverse unsafe individual 
acts and locational factors. These measures were the need 
to strengthen leadership in the nursing team, the need for 
investment and for respect for the professional hierarchy in 
the ICU and the importance of investing in effective com-
munication between the multi-professional team.
Organizational processes can be improved through 
supervision and team leadership activities. A leadership 
based on reactive and proactive measures can influence the 
motivational aspect, making the individuals upraise their 
particularities through confidence in the decision mak-
ing process(4).
In the managerial aspect, “the personal influence of the 
leader in the creation of environments with high-quality pro-
fessional practice showed a direct and positive relationship, in 
which leadership has a singular impact on the work environ-
ment, fundamental in environments such as the ICU, which has 
a heterogeneous group predisposed to conflictual situations”(12).
Conceptually, “the leader has no delegated authority; 
he obtains power by influence, with emphasis on interper-
sonal relationships, and directs cooperative followers toward 
goals. Nursing leadership has been related to variables such 
as patient satisfaction, work satisfaction, commitment and 
organizational climate, professional productivity, responsibil-
ity, empathy, ability to make decisions, communication and 
effective management”(21).
Error neglect and omission are related to the leadership 
style and difficulties in relationships and communication 
in the workplace, which interfere on the surfacing of errors 
and on the opportunity to understand and manage error.
The traditional approach to health care error not only 
takes the focus away from health systems, but also discour-
ages individuals from reporting error, as they may face a 
series of penalties. It also blames the professional who made 
the mistake, not evaluating the systemic factors that con-
tributed to the event(2).
In the system approach, the basic premise is that human 
beings are fallible and errors are expected even in the best 
organizations. Errors are seen as consequences rather than 
causes, having their origin not in the “perversity of human 
nature”, but in existing systemic factors(22).
In order to encourage reporting of errors, voluntary and 
anonymous reporting instruments are recommended. This mea-
sure does not capture the totality of errors, but it allows to know 
a little more about these episodes and other situations of risk.
A study on error reporting aimed at understanding the 
motivation of the nursing team to adequately notify adverse 
events highlighted that, when professionals understand the 
World Health Organization’s definitions of adverse event, 
incident and harmless incident, they are motivated to fill 
in the notification tools(23). The interviewees emphasized 
that conversations, meetings and trainings with the team 
enable the understanding and resolution of situations of 
error. However, it is essential that these discussions have a 
positive approach and stimulate safety culture.
The safety culture is a necessary practice that should be 
based on the idea that human beings make mistakes, and the 
key to their prevention consists in structuring the systems 
in order to minimize the opportunities for them to happen, 
that is, to stimulate the creation of barriers and safeguards 
to avoid system failures(4).
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CONCLUSION
This study allowed understanding the occurrence of 
errors in care by identifying the active failures and latent 
conditions. The active failures were the mistakes made by 
professionals, such as not checking prescriptions, and latent 
conditions were related to managerial decisions, such as lack 
of professional training. Active failures originate from latent 
conditions, and when both occurs, error occurs.
It is essential to invest in reactive and proactive measures. 
Among the reactive measures, the importance of the recog-
nition of the error by professionals was highlighted, since it 
can be considered the basis for understanding and prevent-
ing error and it can contribute to the adoption of proactive 
measures, such as investment in professional training and 
effective communication.
The adoption of these measures is directly related to the 
organizational safety culture, which allows professionals to 
feel comfortable discussing human error and to take effective 
measures to promote safe and quality care.
We highlight the difficulty to hold the interviews, related 
to the work overload and the reduced number of profession-
als in the scenario studied.
RESUMO
Objetivo: Analisar as falhas ativas e as condições latentes relacionadas aos erros na assistência de enfermagem em terapia intensiva 
e discutir as medidas reativas e proativas referidas pela equipe de enfermagem. Método: Estudo qualitativo, descritivo, exploratório. 
realizado no Centro de Terapia Intensiva de um hospital geral. Os dados foram coletados por meio de entrevistas e observação 
participante e submetidos à análise lexical pelo software ALCESTE® e à análise etnográfica. Resultados: Participaram 36 componentes 
da equipe de enfermagem. O corpus analisado originou três classes lexicais: O erro na assistência de enfermagem em terapia intensiva; 
Falhas ativas e condições latentes relacionadas ao erro da equipe de enfermagem na terapia intensiva; Medidas reativas e proativas 
adotadas pela equipe de enfermagem frente ao erro na terapia intensiva. Conclusão: As medidas reativas e proativas influenciaram a 
cultura de segurança, em especial, o reconhecimento do erro pelos profissionais, contribuindo para a sua prevenção e uma assistência 
segura e de qualidade.  
DESCRITORES
Segurança do Paciente; Erros Médicos; Enfermagem de Cuidados Críticos; Unidades de Terapia Intensiva; Cuidados de Enfermagem.
RESUMEN
Objetivo: Analizar las fallas activas y las condiciones latentes relacionadas con los errores en la asistencia enfermera en cuidados 
intensivos y discutir las medidas reactivas y proactivas referidas por el equipo de enfermería. Método: Estudio cualitativo, exploratorio, 
llevado a cabo en el Centro de Cuidados Intensivos de un hospital general. Se recogieron los datos mediante entrevistas y observación 
participativa. Dichos datos fueron sometidos al análisis lexical por el software ALCESTE® y al análisis etnográfico. Resultados: 
Participaron 36 componentes del equipo de enfermería. El corpus analizado originó tres clases lexicales: El error en la asistencia 
enfermera en cuidados intensivos; Fallas activas y condiciones latentes relacionadas con el error del equipo enfermero en cuidados 
intensivos; medidas reactivas y proactivas adoptadas por el equipo de enfermería ante el error en los cuidados intensivos. Conclusión: 
Las medidas reactivas y proactivas influenciaron la cultura de seguridad, en especial, el reconocimiento del error por los profesionales, 
contribuyendo a su prevención y a una asistencia segura y de calidad.
DESCRIPTORES
Seguridad del Paciente; Errores Médicos; Enfermería de Cuidados Críticos; Unidades de Cuidados Intensivos; Atención de Enfermería.
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